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3 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: A Hard and Realistic Look at Future Realignment and
Reorganization of OSA as a Result of the Planned Termination
of the OXCART Program

1. This paper was prepared making the assumption and basing the recommendations on the premise that Higher Authority approves the continuation of CIA in the covert manned reconnaissance business.

2. Following the disapproval for deployment of BLACK SHIELD to Okinawa in the summer and fall of 1966, I strongly suggested to the Director of OSA that the continuation of the OXCART program should be carefully reviewed with the strong possibility of removing the program from the Agency. In addition it was recommended that we should take the initiative now to draft contingency plans and a recommendation for shedding the OXCART program should be formulated immediately since the continuation of the program, in my opinion, was questionable from a political and budgetary viewpoint. The future of the OXCART program as the result of a recommendation by the Budget Director was officially determined by Higher Authority on 28 December 1966 specifically directing the Agency to close out the program by December 1967, however, maintaining an operational capability up to that time. I believe the rationale behind this decision generally is valid and realistic in most respects and furthermore prompts on our initiative the immediate review of the IDEALIST program to determine the Agency's role in the future.

3. During my tenure with the Agency since 1960 OSA has continued to expand in size both internally and in the field. This expansion was due initially to deployment [redacted] but principally in the 25X1 long run as a result of the impending operational readiness of the OXCART program. Some of the facilities constructed by OSA are used jointly either by IDEALIST and OXCART or other such compatible projects outside OSA. However, OXCART justified the majority of the expansion and in turn should account for a sizeable decrease in the overall size of OSA. Now for the first time OSA should take advantage of having to give up the OXCART program and concentrate its efforts on the U-2 and U-2R programs devoting all its professional talent in that direction.

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4. We have received little guidance to date on how best to carry out the termination of OXCART and maintain the spirit of the directive. If we are expected to maintain a real operational capability even though reduced in size by mid year, there is difficulty in predicting the number of man hours and costs involved. However, we do not expect to see any significant personnel or costs savings in the immediate future; and the real personnel and cost adjustment cannot be appreciated until we receive some additional guidance. In the meantime, further tightening of money is predictable as evidenced by a recent suggestion that we look into moving the U-2 facilities at Edwards Air Force Base to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.

5. The Executive Committee noted in December 1966 that a study to effect savings would be performed to determine the feasibility of moving the U-2 assets presently at Edwards to Davis-Monthan. It is my opinion that no significant savings would be accomplished by this move and that the Agency would jeopardize its method of operation, security and ultimately the program in effecting such a move. I firmly believe that rather than have other agencies such as the NRO, Air Force, BOB, etc. make recommendations to anyone as to how this program should be run that DDS&T should initiate and act on a few of its own recommendations firmly and realistically, in light of the economic situation that exists presently and the possible future applications of the U-2 from both an historical record and a hard look at future operational prospects. Since OSA presented the concept of the establishment of Edwards, it should also review periodically and realistically the rationale behind the continuation of this establishment rather than let other agencies do this for us and dictate our methods of operation because of our own default. It is my firm belief that we must take immediate action to review the need for the base at Edwards and if the results dictate, follow up this review with immediate plans and action to pre-empt the NRO or some other agency from directly or indirectly effecting the change for us.

6. The facility at Edwards has been visited by many outside individuals and is of particular concern to the BOB and NRO at this time due to the questionable need or at least our inability to convince them that it is really necessary. I honestly see no reason why the facility at Edwards cannot be phased out in the near future with the IDEALIST program concentrating on the base [] Flight testing could be performed [] and to some degree at Van Nuys for both the U-2 and the U-2R.

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Once the U-2R becomes operational, there should be even less need for continuation of active Agency participation [] in calendar 1968.

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25X1 7. The dual mission concept should also be reviewed for practicality. Should this concept continue to be desirable from an operational stand-
25X1 point, I believe it could be realigned and effected much more realistically
[] This would eventually mean the deployment of probably
two additional aircraft [] on a permanent basis in addition to
those two now present. Construction of additional quarters and facilities
25X1 [] to accommodate the personnel increase which would occur
could be done economically. The addition of some assets to the base at
25X1 [] could also be done economically with the idea of using the
latter base to a greater and more effective extent than employed in the
past. The need for a U-2 in some other part of the world ("dual staging")
could be accomplished by deploying [] almost as easily as 25X1
from Edwards. The projected savings in cost and manpower would be
significant.

8. I appreciate that present plans for test facilities for the new U-2R would be affected by the above recommended relocation of the Edwards assets; however, I am certain none of these problems are unsurmountable and would ultimately affect a more secure operation for the Agency as well as a significant savings in money and manpower. []

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9. It has been my experience that particularly in the manned aircraft reconnaissance business guidance is not automatically provided by the more senior Agency and NRO officials and that DDS&T should make recommendations to the Director as soon as possible before the BOB, the NRO or anyone else pre-empts those actions which we could accomplish now on our own, or at least be the initiating Agency for the change in re-organizing our own programs.

10. The Agency U-2 program has never had a charter and any role or mission that we employ has never been established in writing. I believe this is another action that should be accomplished as soon as possible, having the Director approach Higher Authority himself to reconfirm the

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continuation of the Agency's role in the U-2 program. Once we have obtained the administration's approval for the desirability for the continuation of this program, functions should be considerably easier and we should be less vulnerable in the future to sniping and forced realignment which recently has occurred even more frequently than in the past.

RECOMMENDATIONS/PROPOSALS:

1. That OSA/DDS&T be provided soonest firm guidance on terminating the OXCART program, including interpretations of the BOB intent vis a vis timing, funding, mothballing, etc.
2. That the Director of Central Intelligence confirm with Higher Authority the Agency continuing in the manned reconnaissance business and specifically the U-2 program.
3. That OSA/DDS&T be directed to plan now to move out of Edwards AFB and carry on [] as the central location for all U-2 operations, assets and training.
4. That NRO approve use [] for U-2R development and flight test through 1968. (The possible basing of TAGBOARD at [] may have some favorable impact.)
5. That OSA submit a plan by 15 March whereby it will reduce its present overall compliment of personnel at least 60 percent by March 1968. OSA will further review its organization at that time and level off by August 1968 with the most efficient number of personnel commensurate with their mission.
6. That administration and responsibility of certain offices now in OSA such as the Comptroller, Research & Development, Contracts, etc. be moved to DDS&T to continue to support OSA but assume additional functions for OSP, ORD, OEL and others as the Directorate's needs arise. This action would permit OSA to better concentrate on its primary mission.

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Executive Officer
Office of Special Activities

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